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ABSTRACT
Objectives Since its emergence in late 2019, SARS- 
CoV-2 has caused a global pandemic that has significantly 
challenged healthcare systems. Healthcare workers have 
previously been shown to have experienced higher rates of 
infection than the general population. We aimed to assess 
the extent of infection in staff working in our healthcare 
setting.
Design A retrospective analysis of antibody results, 
compared with staff demographic data, and exposure to 
patients with COVID-19 infection.
Setting A large teaching hospital in the North West of 
England.
Participants 4474 staff in diverse clinical and non- patient 
facing roles who volunteered for SARS- CoV-2 antibody 
testing by the Roche Elecsys assay between 29 May and 
4 July 2020.
Results Seroprevalence was 17.4%. Higher rates were 
seen in Asian/Asian British (OR 1.61, 95% CI 1.27 to 2.04) 
and Black/Black British (OR 2.08, 95% CI 1.25 to 3.45) 
staff. Staff working in any clinical location were more 
likely to be seropositive (OR 2.68, 95% 2.27 to 3.15). Staff 
were at an increased risk of seropositivity as the ‘per 
100 COVID-19 bed- days change’ increased in the clinical 
area in which they worked (OR 1.12, 95% 1.10 to 1.14). 
Staff working in critical care were no more likely to have 
detectable antibodies than staff working in non- clinical 
areas. Symptoms compatible with COVID-19 were reported 
in 41.8% and antibodies were detected in 30.7% of these 
individuals. In staff who reported no symptoms, antibodies 
were detected in 7.7%. In all staff who had detectable 
antibodies, 25.2% reported no symptoms.
Conclusions Staff working in clinical areas where 
patients with COVID-19 were nursed were more likely 
to have detectable antibodies. The relationship between 
seropositivity in healthcare workers and the increase in ‘per 
100 COVID-19 bed- days’ of the area in which they worked, 
although statistically significant, was weak, suggesting 
other contributing factors to the risk profile. Of staff with 
detectable antibodies and therefore evidence of prior 
infection, a quarter self- reported that they had experienced 
no compatible symptoms. This has implications for potential 
unrecorded transmission in both staff and patients.
INTRODUCTION
SARS- CoV-2 has spread globally following 
its first identification in Wuhan, China in 
December 2019.1–3 The WHO declared this 
to be a pandemic on 11 March 2020,4 and 
to date (8 September 2020) there have been 
almost 27 million recorded cases and 900 000 
deaths globally.5 Cases were first identified 
in the UK on 31 January 2020 and to date (8 
September 2020) there have been 350 000 
confirmed cases and over 41 500 deaths.6 7
Studies have shown varying rates of infec-
tion in healthcare workers. These infections 
were determined as current, by detection of 
viral RNA by PCR, or as prior infection, by 
the detection of specific antibodies. National 
data from May 2020 shows increased rates of 
infection in patient- facing and resident- facing 
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This is a large dataset of antibody results in health-
care staff who perform a broad range of roles in a 
large English teaching hospital.
 ► We have been able to compare seropositivity in clin-
ical staff with the level of exposure to patients with 
COVID-19 by looking at patient movements.
 ► Small numbers of respondents in some clinical ar-
eas has prevented the ability to elucidate further 
which areas are genuine outliers that could indicate 
specific good practice or inadequacies leading to 
lower or higher staff infection rates.
 ► This study used a single antibody assay (Roche 
Elecsys) so all results in this study are comparable; 
however, other centres have used different assays, 
which means that comparison between sites is not 
straightforward.
 ► The Roche antibody assay is most sensitive after at 
least 21 days following infection and there is grow-
ing evidence of declining titres with time; therefore, 
false negative results could have been generated.
2 Shorten RJ, et al. BMJ Open 2021;11:e045384. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-045384
Open access 
health/social care staff (1.87%) compared with working 
people in other, non- healthcare associated roles (0.32%).8 
Analysis of registered deaths has shown that male health-
care workers had a higher death rate from COVID-19 
compared with the general working population.9 Rates 
of infection detected in healthcare workers have varied 
geographically. Rates of 2%–3% asymptomatic infections 
have been described in some settings,10 11 while higher 
rates were seen in a London Hospital, with a peak of 
7.1%, at the time that coincided with the peak in their 
local population.12 Houlihan and colleagues demon-
strated rates of SARS CoV-2 infection of 44% in one 
cohort of patient- facing healthcare workers in London 
during a similar time period.13 Rates of 14% and 18% 
were described in symptomatic healthcare workers in 
March 2020, in Newcastle and Sheffield, respectively.14 15 
A study of 554 healthcare workers in Birmingham showed 
that seroconversion had occurred in 24.4%. Higher rates 
were seen in housekeeping (34.5%), acute medicine 
(33.3%), and general internal medicine (30.3%). Lower 
rates were seen in critical care (14.8%) and the emer-
gency department (13.3%).16 Oxford University Hospi-
tals showed evidence of SARS- CoV-2 infection in 11% of 
their surveyed staff, also with higher rates seen in patient 
facing areas, including acute medicine.17
The emergence of this novel virus means that we have 
much to learn about its biology, host immunological 
response, and variable rates of infection. Additionally, 
there is a need to investigate the impact on the infection 
rate of the healthcare work force and the effectiveness of 
processes used to mitigate this. Here, we aimed to conduct 
a period prevalence study to ascertain the proportion of 
staff who had been infected with SARS- CoV-2.
METHODS
Setting
Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
(LTH) is one of the largest acute Trusts in the UK, 
providing district general hospital services to 370 000 
people in Chorley, Preston and South Ribble and specialist 
care to 1.7 million people across Lancashire and South 
Cumbria. Approximately, 700 beds are spilt over two sites, 
Royal Preston Hospital and Chorley and South Ribble 
District Hospital. It employs circa 8500 staff, equating to 
circa 7600 full- time equivalents. In our Teaching Hospital 
setting the assessment, segregation and management of 
suspected COVID-19 patients were performed in align-
ment with Public Health England (PHE) guidance at 
the time. The trust was largely closed to elective admis-
sions during this period and patients with COVID-19 
were cared for throughout the trust. Patients were segre-
gated on admission and placed in Green (COVID-19 
not suspected), Amber (COVID-19 suspected but not 
confirmed) and Red (COVID-19 confirmed) areas. It was 
not possible to separate these areas into different wards; 
wards tended to have a mix of different types of patients, 
although separated into different bays, with bay doors 
closed. Isolation of all suspected cases in side- rooms was 
also not possible due to large numbers of admissions. 
Most suspected cases were nursed in Amber bays, pending 
the results of COVID-19 swabs and medical review. 
Throughout the first peak of the epidemic (March–July 
2020), the hospital followed PHE guidance on the use of 
personal protective equipment (PPE).
Participants
We undertook a retrospective, anonymised analysis of 
SARS- CoV-2 antibody results in staff members at LTH 
between 29 May and 4 July 2020. All staff, regardless of 
role, were offered a serum antibody test for SARS- CoV-2 
using the Roche Elecsys total immunoassay method 
(Roche Diagnostics, Burgess Hill, UK). The sensitivity 
and specificity were determined for the Roche Elecsys 
assay by an in house verification using 160 known positive 
RT- PCR patient samples and 199 prepandemic negative 
samples. Specificity was 100% and a maximum sensitivity 
of 92% was found to be at day 21. Additionally, both 
within and between batch precision was calculated using 
positive and negative patient samples. For all samples, the 
%CVs were less than 5%. All staff were required to give 
written consent for the test, which included continued 
agreement to adhere to local infection prevention and 
control policies regardless of the outcome of the test.
Self-report survey
Staff were additionally asked to self- report via a ques-
tionnaire whether they had previously tested positive for 
SARS- CoV-2 (by PCR), and whether they had experienced 
any compatible symptoms (online supplemental material 
1). All staff who experienced compatible symptoms were 
excluded from work and offered a SARS- CoV-2 PCR. Staff 
with a confirmed diagnosis could return to work 10 days 
after the positive test if they were well. Staff who tested 
negative were permitted to return to work if they were 
well enough to do so. Self- reported PCR was used as some 
individuals may have accessed pillar two testing outside of 
the trust and these results would not be accessible. Loca-
tion of work, and individual demographic data collected 
from the consent forms were cross- referenced with elec-
tronic staff records.
Trust-wide COVID-19 data
Information was retrieved from the Trust's Patient Admin-
istration System (PAS, QuadraMed, Texas, USA). This 
system logs every patient bed move with a date and a time. 
In mid- March, LTH introduced dashboards (Qlikview, 
Pennsylvania, USA) which combined COVID-19 test data 
with patient location data from the PAS. Bed movements 
of COVID-19 positive patients were analysed, including 
ward, and bed- space check- in and check- out dates and 
times. The dashboard included data on the first positive 
COVID-19 test performed in that visit; the date of sample 
collection and the date of the report. All inpatient bed- 
days in the hospital visit after the first positive COVID-19 
sample were included in the analysis and designated 
3Shorten RJ, et al. BMJ Open 2021;11:e045384. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-045384
Open access
‘COVID-19 positive inpatient bed- days’. These data were 
analysed to 8 July 2020, which encompassed the first peak 
of incidence in our trust, and was used to assess varying 
exposure to patients with COVID-19 in different clinical 
areas.
There were 872 COVID-19 infected inpatients iden-
tified by PCR at LTH; 244 patients died; 610 patients 
were discharged home; 18 patients remained in hospital 
as of 8 July 2020. In total, these patients represented 
9239 COVID-19 positive inpatient bed days. A total of 
42 clinical locations were identified and the number of 
COVID- beds days were estimated for each location. These 
locations included clinical areas with no patients with 
COVID-19, such as the entire Women’s and Children’s 
Division. Other workplaces such as offices, pathology and 
pharmacy were designated as a single non- clinical loca-
tion with no patients with COVID-19.
Statistical analysis
Summary statistics were used for descriptive analyses. 
Sensitivity and specificity were calculated with the stan-
dard formulae. The primary modelling framework was 
binary logistic regression for which the outcome was 
a positive or negative antibody test. The demographic 
predictors in the logistic regression were age (as a quan-
titative covariate), gender and ethnicity. Ethnicity was 
categorised into six ethnic groups and a seventh group 
which comprised all respondents for whom ethnicity was 
unknown. This approach allowed only those of known 
ethnicity to contribute to the estimates for their ethnic 
group but allowed all respondents to contribute to esti-
mates for age, gender and environmental location. Loca-
tion was initially categorised into two types; non- clinical 
and clinical locations. Location was also classified into 43 
separate locations, the first being all non- clinical locations 
combined and the remainder being 42 different clinical 
locations. Each of the clinical locations was ascribed an 
estimated number of COVID-19 bed- days as described 
above. Finally, location was classified into four main types 
comprising all non- clinical locations, emergency depart-
ment, critical care and all remaining clinical locations 
combined. Logistic regressions that included individual 
locations were restricted to those locations with at least 
30 participants to avoid large confidence intervals and 
over- parameterisation.
Logistic regression models prevalence using a linear 
model for the logarithm of the odds where odds are 
defined as the ratio of the positive outcomes to the nega-
tive outcomes. Results are presented as ORs where the OR 
measures the extent to which one group has a different 
risk of the positive outcome relative to a reference group. 
Thus, an OR of 2.0 implies that this group has twice the 
odds of a positive outcome compared with the reference 
group. The reference group thus always has an OR of 1.0. 
Higher risk groups have an OR greater than 1.0 and lower 
risk groups have an OR of less than 1.0. The reference 
groups in this study were male gender, white UK or ROI 
ethnicity and zero COVID-19 bed days. The modelling 
approach allows locations to be compared for prevalence 
after adjustment has been made for demographic differ-
ences between different locations. Statistical analyses 
were performed using IBM SPSS.
Patient and public involvement
Patients or the public were not involved in the design, 
or conduct, or reporting, or dissemination plans of our 
research. Results will be made available to all staff and 
patients via our usual communication channels.
RESULTS
Summary statistics
Staff with incomplete data (37/4511) were excluded in 
the data analysis stage. These staff were excluded because 
age and gender were not known, the antibody test result 
was invalid, or there was a major inconsistency in the 
demographic data. This resulted in 4474 individuals 
being included in all analyses except where individual 
location ORs were estimated. In this case, exclusion of 
locations with fewer than 30 participants resulted in 4189 
individuals included. Staff who presented for antibody 
testing were representative of Trust staff in regard to age, 
sex, ethnicity and staff type when compared with work-
force staff records (data not shown) and hence results 
presented are unlikely to contain any inherent bias. Anti-
bodies were detected in 777 (17.4%) individuals (table 1).
Demographic characteristics
Older staff were less likely to be seropositive (OR 0.988, 
95% CI 0.982 to 0.994, p<0.001) per 1 year change 
(table 2). Staff who were Asian/Asian British (OR 1.61, 
95% CI 1.27 to 2.04) and black/black British (OR 2.08, 
95% CI 1.25 to 3.50) were more likely to have detectable 
antibodies than staff of white UK/ROI ethnicity when 
corrected for age, gender and clinical location (table 2).
Locations
Staff working in any clinical location where patients with 
COVID-19 were nursed were more likely to be seropositive 
(OR 2.68, 95% 2.27 to 3.15) when corrected for age, sex 
and ethnicity (table 2). There was a positive association of 
staff seropositivity per 100 COVID-19 bed- day increase in 
the clinical area in which they worked (OR 1.12, 95% 1.10 
to 1.14, p<0.001). The relationship between COVID-19 
bed days and staff seropositivity was significant, but weak. 
The superimposed trend line through the logarithm of 
the odds ratios (treated as single points) illustrates the 
substantial non- conformity with a linear relationship with 
COVID-19 bed- days (figure 1). Staff working in either the 
emergency department or in critical care were no more 
likely to have detectable antibodies than staff working in 
non- clinical areas (table 3). Patients with COVID-19 were 
cared for throughout the trust and the ‘COVID-19 bed 
days’ demonstrates the range of potential staff exposure 
across medical and surgical wards. Of note however, the 
increased risk of seroconversion of staff working in the 
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emergency department only just failed to reach signifi-
cance (OR 1.38, 95% 0.98 to 1.93, p=0.062). One medical 
ward demonstrated the largest positive trend to staff sero-
positivity (OR 15.36, 95% CI 7.21 to 32.74); however, the 
relatively small number of responders generated a wide 
CI (table 3).
Prevalence and symptoms
Most staff responded to the question regarding whether 
they had experienced symptoms compatible with 
COVID-19 (4418/4474). Of these responders, 41.8% 
(1871/4474) reported symptoms. Antibodies were 
detected in 574/1871 (30.7%) individuals who reported 
symptoms, and 196/2547 (7.7%) individuals who 
reported no symptoms (table 4). Of those with antibodies 
detected, 25.2% (196/777) reported no symptoms. Sensi-
tivity and specificity of self- reported symptoms as an 
indication of COVID-19 infection were 74.5% (95% CI 
71.3% to 77.6%) and 64.5% (95% CI 62.9% to 66.0%), 
respectively.
Testing for SARS- CoV-2 by PCR was reported by 772 
individuals. A valid result was recorded or available for 
746 of these staff members (staff who recorded that they 
were not informed of their result, and invalid results were 
excluded). A small number of staff (n=5) self- reported a 
positive SARS- CoV-2 PCR but tested antibody negative. 
Antibodies were detected in 79 members of staff who self- 
reported a negative PCR.
DISCUSSION
We report a large dataset of SARS- CoV-2 antibody results 
for staff performing various roles in a large teaching 
hospital. We are not aware of any other published dataset 
of comparable size, nor of any that have used this Roche 
antibody assay in healthcare workers. Our finding of 
17.4% seroprevalence in our staff compares to a range of 
7%–44% in other studies.12–17 Differences in the number 
of staff infections have varied geographically. This is likely 
to be multifactorial and the number of infections in the 
local community is likely to contribute. By the end of this 
study period (early July 2020), it was estimated that sero-
prevalence in the North West of England as a whole was 
approximately 8%.18 It is also noteworthy that numerous 
antibody assays are being used nationally and their 
different performance characteristics may contribute to 
these differences. Our findings that staff working in most 
clinical areas are more likely to have been infected with 
SARS- CoV-2 than non- clinical staff are concordant with 
other studies. Likewise, the finding that lower rates of 
infection in staff working in the emergency or critical care 
departments demonstrated in this study has been noted 
previously.16 Higher rates of infection in black and ethnic 
minority individuals have also been reported nationally.19
Table 1 Summary statistics of respondents to invitation to 
undergo antibody testing (n=4474)
Demographic 
characteristics
Gender: n (%) Male 980 (21.9)
Age: mean (SD) Years 42.5 (13.2)
Ethnicity: n (%) Asian/Asian British 492 (11.0)
Black/black British 79 (1.8)
Chinese 21 (0.5)
Mixed 66 (1.5)
White UK and ROI 3143 (70.3)




Locations: n (%) Non- clinical 2728 (61.0)
Emergency department 305 (6.8)
Critical care 209 (4.7)
Other clinical locations 1232 (27.5)
Clinical 
characteristics
PCR result: n (%) Positive 209 (4.7)
Negative 541 (12.1)
Not performed 3698 (82.7)
Inconclusive 16 (0.4)
Unknown 10 (0.2)
Symptoms: n (%) Yes 1871 (41.8)
No 2547 (56.9)
Unknown 56 (1.3)
Antibody result: n (%) Positive 777 (17.4)
Negative 3697 (82.6)
Table 2 OR from the binary logistic regression for 
demographic characteristics and location type (n=4474)
OR 95% CI P value
Age per 1 year 
change




Female 1.060 0.868 to 1.293 0.568
White UK and ROI 
(reference category)
1.000
Asian/Asian British 1.608 1.266 to 2.042 <0.001
White other 1.275 0.792 to 2.051 0.317
Black/black British 2.080 1.254 to 3.449 0.005
Mixed 0.722 0.351 to 1.487 0.377
Chinese 0.619 0.179 to 2.145 0.449
Unknown ethnicity 1.441 1.140 to 1.823 0.002
Non- clinical location 
(reference category)
1.000
Clinical location 2.675 2.268 to 3.154 <0.001
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Figure 1 ORs for individual clinical locations relative to a non- clinical location against COVID-19 bed- days at each location; 
points are ORs, bars are 95% CIs and dashed line illustrates the trend through ORs treated as points.
Table 3 COVID-19 bed- days and OR for seropositivity from the binary logistic regression for demographic characteristics and 
the 24 different locations with 30 or more respondents (n=4189); only ORs for locations shown
Location Staff N (%) OR 95% CI P value COVID-19 bed- days
Non- clinical location (reference category) 3013 (67.3%) 1.000 0
Emergency department 305 (6.8%) 1.377 0.984 to 1.927 0.062 0
Critical care unit 209 (4.7%) 1.190 0.783 to 1.808 0.416 770
Medical 34 (0.8%) 15.364 7.209 to 32.741 <0.001 223
Medical 56 (1.3%) 10.455 6.045 to 18.084 <0.001 835
Medical 32 (0.7%) 6.203 3.041 to 12.656 <0.001 366
Surgical 45 (1.0%) 5.917 3.222 to 10.864 <0.001 77
Surgical 53 (1.2%) 5.691 3.242 to 9.989 <0.001 201
Medical 43 (1.0%) 5.646 3.016 to 10.567 <0.001 987
Surgical 40 (0.9%) 5.569 2.923 to 10.610 <0.001 84
Medical 40 (0.9%) 5.003 2.612 to 9.583 <0.001 1570
Medical 68 (1.5%) 4.892 2.944 to 8.129 <0.001 846
Surgical 49 (1.1%) 4.297 2.370 to 7.790 <0.001 564
Surgical 36 (0.8%) 4.270 2.126 to 8.575 <0.001 242
Medical 44 (1.0%) 3.863 2.032 to 7.342 <0.001 88
Medical 40 (0.9%) 3.629 1.837 to 7.171 <0.001 135
Medical 30 (0.7%) 3.096 1.392 to 6.888 0.006 68
Medical 43 (1.0%) 2.519 1.249 to 5.083 0.010 163
Surgical 44 (1.0%) 2.491 1.253 to 4.950 0.009 43
Surgical 53 (1.2%) 2.191 1.133 to 4.239 0.020 102
Medical 68 (1.5%) 1.479 0.778 to 2.815 0.233 570
Medical 44 (1.0%) 1.433 0.631 to 3.257 0.390 226
Surgical 45 (1.0%) 1.310 0.576 to 2.977 0.520 7




Change per 100 bed- days 1.115 1.089 to 1.142 <0.001
OR for 100 bed- days change also shown (n=4474).
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The finding that the number of COVID-19 bed- days 
of a clinical area correlates with the prevalence of staff 
seropositivity is intuitive. However, this weak association 
suggests that factors other than the number of patients 
with COVID-19 in a clinical area contribute to the risk 
of staff infection. These could be numerous, and not 
limited to: adequacy and compliance with PPE, relative 
ventilation and air changes per hour, social distancing of 
staff groups within the clinical and recreational areas, and 
inappropriate de- escalation of patients with COVID-19 
based on false- negative PCR results. This latter risk was 
somewhat mitigated by the introduction of fluid- resistant 
surgical masks in all patient- facing healthcare workers 
from early April. It was not possible to ascertain why some 
clinical areas have higher numbers of staff seroconver-
sion than others. This is likely to be multifactorial and 
would require further investigation. The finding that a 
quarter of staff with antibodies reported no compatible 
symptoms indicates that asymptomatic infection occurred 
at significant levels and has implications for the control of 
this pandemic. It should be considered that onward trans-
mission from such individuals may be possible if compli-
ance with guidance regarding PPE and distancing is not 
followed.
Of the staff (2/5) whose positive PCR was performed 
at our trust, the PCR result preceded the antibody test 
by at least 21 days, allowing sufficient time to produce 
antibodies. These discrepancies could be a result of a 
false- positive PCR result, a false- negative antibody result, 
or a genuine case of no immune response being elicited. 
Likewise, it was not possible to definitively determine 
why some staff had demonstrable antibodies and a nega-
tive PCR result. This may be due to a myriad of reasons, 
including the timing or quality of the swab sampling, or 
that the symptoms that prompted testing were due to 
another cause and individuals were previously, or subse-
quently, asymptomatically infected with SARS- CoV-2.
This retrospective analysis has some limitations. First, 
although comparison with trust electronic staff records 
shows that our respondents are representative of the trust 
as a whole, there is a potential for ascertainment bias 
with staff who knew or believed that they were infected 
to be more likely to come forward for testing. The 
varying numbers of individuals in different clinical areas 
have generated wide confidence intervals. This reduces 
the ability to elucidate further which areas are genuine 
outliers that could indicate specific good practice or inad-
equacies leading to lower or higher staff infection rates. 
This study used a single antibody assay so all results in this 
study are comparable. However, other centres have used 
different assays, which means comparison of rates of staff 
infection between sites is not straightforward. Further-
more, the Roche antibody assay is most sensitive after 
at least 21 days following infection and there is growing 
evidence of declining titres with time. It is therefore 
possible that false negative results could be generated as 
a result of sampling staff prior to 21 days after infection, 
or due to waning antibody titres if infection occurred far 
earlier in the pandemic.
This COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated new ways of 
working and has led to innovation in healthcare systems. 
As the clinical presentation and progression have been 
more clearly characterised, along with a greater under-
standing of the diagnostic tools available, case finding 
(especially nosocomial infection) has improved. This 
should reduce the frequency in which infected patients 
are inappropriately de- escalated to non- COVID-19 areas, 
and therefore reduce further transmission, including to 
Table 4 Symptoms and COVID-19 antibody prevalence
Respondents’ self- report:
Symptomatic (n=1871) Asymptomatic (n=2547)
Non- response 
(n=56)
Antibody test negative:   PCR result:
  Negative 375 85 2
  Positive 5 0 0
  Not performed 906 2261 47
  Inconclusive 7 3 0
  Unknown 4 2 0
  Total (69.3%) 1297 (92.3%) 2351 49
Antibody test positive:   PCR result:
  Negative 73 6 0
  Positive 199 3 2
  Not performed 293 186 5
  Inconclusive 6 0 0
  Unknown 3 1 0
  Total (30.7%) 574 (7.7%) 196 7
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staff. Our data clearly show that staff who work in clin-
ical areas with large numbers of COVID-19 patients are 
more likely to have demonstrable SARS CoV-2 infec-
tion. However, this is not the only correlating factor. 
Using these data to further reduce the risk to healthcare 
workers in all settings must be a priority. Real- time data to 
show particular hotspots with high numbers of COVID-19 
bed- days could prompt proactive staff surveillance, with 
enhanced audit of infection prevention and control prac-
tice in areas with suspected high rates of transmission.
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